This Online Appendix reports results supplementary to the paper "The Effects of AnalystCountry Institutions on Biased Research: Evidence from Target Prices." We report additional robustness tests that we carry out for the main results of the paper. These results include testing our hypothesis on earnings forecast optimism instead of target price optimism, controlling for firm-country characteristics for the full sample of observations, controlling for both firm and analyst fixed effects, and different country weighting schemes for the regression results.
Analyst Earnings Forecast Optimism
We control for concurrent earnings forecast optimism (optimism_eps) when we examine the determinants of analyst target price optimism in the main text. Nonetheless, we replicate our main table of Panel B of Table 5 to examine whether analyst earnings forecast optimism, another major form of biased research by analysts, is associated with analyst-country institutions. We replace the dependent variable with earnings forecast optimism, computed as the signed forecast error in the annual earnings forecast by the same analyst for the same firm within one year of the target price issuance date. Besides the control variables in Panel B of Table 5 , we control additionally for year-quarterly fixed effects and for forecast horizon between the earnings forecast date and the forecast period end date. Table A1 shows that the coefficients on the five proxies for analyst-country institutions are all negative, and are significant for all except for the marginally significant judicial variable. Our main finding that strong institutions at analystcountry mitigate analyst forecast bias thus holds with earnings forecast optimism.
[ Table A1 about here.]
Controlling for Firm-Country Characteristics for the Full Sample
In the main text, we show in Table 8 that our results are robust to controlling for firmcountry characteristics for the sample of non-local analyst. Table A2 reports the results for the full sample that also includes local analysts. It shows that out of 20 regressions, 19 coefficients for the analyst-country traits are significantly negative, similar to the results of Table 8 and also to those in Panel B of Table 5 of the main text.
[ Table A2 about here.]
Control for Both Analyst and Firm Fixed Effects
For the analyst location-change subsample, we control for both analyst and firm fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects only. The purpose is to ensure that the identification comes from analyst location changes only. The results are in Table A3 . We find that except for judicial in the determinant of TP/P, the coefficients on the analyst-country traits are negative in all of the rest 19 regressions, and are significant at conventional levels in 13 cases. We thus conclude that even after controlling for both analyst and firm fixed effects, strong institutions at analyst locations mitigate analyst target price optimism.
[ Table A3 about here.]
Country Weighting
Differential data availability across countries affects the weighting of the institutional variables in the regressions. We address this issue in two ways. First, our sample is dominated by U.S. analysts, who provide more than one-third of target price forecasts. To examine whether our results are disproportionately affected by the U.S. analysts, we remove U.S. analysts from the sample and examine the subsample of non-U.S. analysts only. Panel A of Table A4 presents the results. The main inferences are qualitatively the same as those of the full sample in Table 5 of the main text.
[ Table A4 about here.] Second, we balance the weighting of countries by restricting each analyst to only one target price forecast for a given year in her domicile country. To do so, we collapse observations to the mean values of variables at the analyst-country-year level. The number of observations is significantly reduced to 52,787 observations. Panel B of Table A4 reports the results for this analyst-country-year sample. The effects of investor protection traits remain qualitatively the same as those of the full sample in Table 5 of the main text. In untabulated results, we can also report that our results are robust if we further collapse the sample to the country-year level. Thus, our results are robust to implicit weighting of institutional variables due to differential data availability across countries. Table A1 The
Effects of Analyst-Country Institutions on Analyst Earnings Forecast Optimism
This table reports regression results on the determinants of earnings forecast optimism (optimism_eps) for our full sample of 1,129,974 observations. horizon_eps is the forecast horizon between the earnings forecast date and the forecast period end date. All other variables are the same as those in Table 5 of the main text. All of the models include firm and year-quarter fixed effects. We report t-statistics clustered at headquarter country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) This table shows the results of analyst-country traits after controlling for the corresponding firm-country traits for the full sample. An analyst-country trait and its corresponding firm-country trait (with the suffix "_firm") are both added to the baseline regressions of Panel A, Table 5 . For example, legal_system and its firm-country counterpart, legal_system_firm are both added to the regression. In the table, each such pair represents a separate regression of an optimism measure regressed on a given country trait pair and the control variables, with the results for control variables omitted for brevity. All of the models include firm and year fixed effects. We report t-statistics clustered at firm's headquarter country in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table 5 in the main text. The only exception is that we include analyst fixed effects in addition to firm fixed effects. We define the variables in Appendix A of the main text. We report t-statistics clustered at headquarter country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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(1) Panel A shows the results of analyst-country traits on target price optimism for non-US sample which has 710,279 observations. Panel B reports the regression results for the analyst-country-year sample, in which all variables are averaged at the analyst-country-year level (52,787 observations). The regression specifications are the same as in Panel B of Table 5 except that in Panel B of this table, we cluster standard errors at the year level. Each cell in the table represents a separate regression of an optimism measure regressed on a given country trait and the control variables, with the results for control variables omitted for brevity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
